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Abstract
We elicit risk preferences of French farmers in a ﬁeld experimental setting under expected
utility theory and cumulative prospect theory. We use two different estimation methods,
namely the interval approach and the estimation of a random preference model. On average,
farmers are risk averse and loss averse. They also exhibit an inverse S-shaped probability
weighting function, meaning that they tend to overweight small probabilities and underweight
high probabilities. We infer from our results that CPT explains farmers’ behaviour better
than EUT in the context of our experiment. We also investigate how preferences correlate
with individual socio-demographic characteristics. We ﬁnd that education and agricultural
innovation are negatively linked with risk aversion. Our results also show that age, education,
household size and the level of secured income tend to lower farmers’ loss aversion. Finally,
older farmers and farmers with large farms distort probabilities less than the others. These
ﬁndings contribute to the literature which compares expected utility with competing decision
theories. They also give important insights into farmers’ behaviour towards risk, which is
critical for relevant public policy design.
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11 Introduction
Risk and uncertainty play a signiﬁcant role in almost every important economic decision. Since
people differ in the way they take decisions involving risk and uncertainty, and since these
differences are often described as differences in risk attitude, understanding individual risk
preferences is a prerequisite to understand economic behaviour.
Numerous theories have been proposed to describe decision making under uncertainty, but
expected utility theory (EUT) has dominated empirical research since its formulation by von
Neumann and Morgenstern (1947). Indeed, most of the attempts to propose better representations
of risky choices have not made it into mainstream economics. Though, prospect theory (PT)
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979) is a notable exception. Supported by the growing evidence
for probability weighting and loss aversion, today PT seriously challenges the standard EUT
(Camerer 1998, Starmer 2000).
Moving forward the debate between EUT and competing theories of decision under risk has
been one important objective of experimental studies for the last two decades. The seminal works
by Harless and Camerer (1994) and Hey and Orme (1994)initiatedtheuse ofeconometricmethods
to estimate decision models from observed behaviour and gave way to formal methods to compare
theories.
In this paper, we propose to test EUT against PT after estimating preferences with formal
econometric methods.
Whereas most of the literature on risk preference elicitation relies on lab experiments, we
implement a ﬁeld experiment using a systematic sample of French farmers. Harrison and
List (2004) stressed the complementarity of both approaches to give sharper and more relevant
inference on ﬁeld behaviour. Experimental elicitation of farmers’ risk preferences in the context of
developed countries are rare (Pennings and Smidts 2003, Reynaud and Couture 2010) , and, to our
knowledge, real money incentives have never been used in this context. Eliciting risk preferences
on such a populationis worth being undertaken from a publicpolicy perspective. Whileagriculture
is typically a risky activity, subject to uncertain climate and market environments, there is no
consensus in the agricultural economic literature on the level of farmers’ risk aversion. Thus, more
investigations are needed to design adequate policy instruments.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we survey studies that have
formally tested decision weighting models against expected utility on a sample of farmers. Then,
we describeour experimentalprotocol. The procedures for theestimationof preference parameters
under EUT and PT are exposed in Section 4. The results are presented in Section 5.
2 Relevant Literature
The study of rational behaviour under uncertainty has been dominated by EUT (von Neumann
and Morgenstern 1947) since 1947. Although empirical data quickly demonstrated the existence
of systematic violations , its rigorous axiomatic base, simplicity of using, and normative appeal
made EUT keep the primacy over alternative propositions during decades. Today, decision
weighting theories constitute the main alternative to EUT. They have in common preferences
over prospects that are non linear in probabilities, provided that subjects convert objective
probabilities of individual outcomes into weights before they make choices. These weights
involve some probability weighting function which is inverse S-shaped, meaning that individuals
underweight high and overweight low probabilities. Among the decision weighting models, thebest known can be classiﬁed as sign-dependent - e.g., separable prospect theory (SPT) (Kahneman
and Tversky 1979) - or rank-dependent- e.g., rank-dependent expected utility theory (RDEUT)
(Quiggin 1982). The cumulative prospect theory (CPT) (Tversky and Kahneman 1992) joins the
most interesting features of SPT and RDEUT, namely outcome valuation relative to reference
points and cumulative decision weights.
Field experiments with farmers leading to comparisons between decision theories are scarce.
In most of them, model selection is not the core question. Harrison, Humphrey, and Verschoor
(2010) and Galarza (2009) are noteworthy exceptions, the authors estimating mixture models
with maximum likelihood methods among farmers in developing countries. Instead of estimating
the parameters of each model assuming only one describes behaviour, in mixture models the
coexistence of several theories is explicitly recognized. All preference parameters are jointly
estimated, in addition to mixing probabilities which quantify the prevalence of each theory in
the sample. Harrison, Humphrey, and Verschoor (2010) ﬁnd mixing proportions for a EUT-SPT
mixture model close to 0.5. Galarza (2009) estimate that 30% of the cotton producers from their
sample exhibit EUT while 70% follow RDEUT.
A few other studies propose an elicitation of CPT parameters for rural people. Nguyen (2009)
and Tanaka, Camerer, and Nguyen (2010) use the same experimental design with rural Vietnamese
households (46% are farmers), as well as Liu (2010) but with Chinese cotton farmers. This design
includes mixed lotteries, and this is the one we adapt in this paper. Whereas Tanaka, Camerer,
and Nguyen (2010) and Liu (2010) infer intervals for parameters directly from responses, Nguyen
(2009) estimates by maximum likelihood a random preference model. They all ﬁnd that CPT
describes their data better than EUT.
In the context of developed countries, we are not aware of any experimental paper estimating
the parameters of some decision weighting model on a sample of farmers.
3 Experimental protocol
3.1 Experimental design and procedure
Our experimental design is adapted from Tanaka, Camerer, and Nguyen (2010) who elicit CPT
parameters of Vietnamese rural households and correlate them with economic circumstances and
individualcharacteristics. TherearethreeseriesofquestionswhicharevariantsofHoltandLaury’s
(2002) multiple price lists. Subjects are presented with a succession of pairs of binary lotteries,
each pair being composed of a safe lottery (option A) and a risky lottery (option B), and they are
asked to pick one at each row. In the ﬁrst two series, payoffs are all positive whereas, in the third
and last series, lotteries mix positiveand negativeoutcomes. To enforce monotonicity, subjects are
asked to pick the row at which they prefer lottery B rather than lottery A.
The lotteries each subject is presented with are displayed in Table 1.
The experiment was led after face-to-face interviews from February to June 2010. The
experiment was the last part of a 2-hour survey aiming at understanding the relation between the
adoption of agricultural innovation, production practices and risk management. We also collected
farmers’ socio-demographic characteristics. The experiment, which lasted around half an hour,
was divided into three different tasks: a risk task, an ambiguity task, and a time task. In this paper,
we only analyse the results from the risk task. A comprehensive introduction of the methods
and goals, as well as examples, were given to respondents prior to the tests to ensure a good
comprehension. Subjects were provided with an initial endowment of 15 euros. After the subject
3had completed all three tasks, one row was randomly selected and the lottery chosen by the subject
played for real money. As we were not able to pay the full payoffs (ranging from -600 to 6,000
euros), the respondents were offered only 2% of these payoffs1. The average earning from the
three tasks was 19 euros.
3.2 Sampling
We organised an artefactual ﬁeld experiment 2, replacing the usual university student population
by a farmer population. We constructed a systematic sample of farmers from 62 rural cities of
eastern France. The region of Bourgogne is diversiﬁed in terms of agricultural production: cereal
crops, livestock, as well as market vegetables and wine. We randomly selected 232 farmers from
those cities, and contacted them by mail ﬁrst, and by phone a few days after. Finally, 111 farmers
accepted to be surveyed within the alloted time. Among them, 48 had enough time to do the




There are several ways of estimating preferences from experimental data. The simplest one
consists in calculating bounds for the parameters from the observed choices. Typically, the
interval method is not adapted for sophisticated preference functionals, because some statements
have to be made about one parameter to calculate the other parameter. However, Tanaka, Camerer,
and Nguyen (2010) experimental design partly avoids this problem for a three-parameter CPT
model.






yσ if y > 0
0 if y = 0
−λ · (−y)σ if y > 0 (λ > 0)
(1)
where σ is the parameter controlling the curvature of the utility function 3 and λ is the coefﬁcient
of loss aversion of the decision maker. Usually, σ < 1 and λ > 1, which stands respectively for
risk aversion and a higher sensitivity to loss than to gain.
Following Tversky and Kahneman (1992), decision weights deﬁned over the cumulative
probability distributions are introduced. The value of the prospect (y1,p;y2,1 − p) writes:
U(y1,p;y2,1 − p) =
 
u(y2) + ω(p)[u(y1) − u(y2)] if y1 > y2 ≥ 0 or y1 < y2 ≤ 0
u(y1)ω(p) + u(y2)ω(1 − p) if y1 < 0 < y or y1 = y2
(2)
1 This procedure was used by other authors dealing with large payoffs in developed countries (Abdellaoui,
Bleichrodt, and L’Haridon 2008) or developing countries (Galarza 2009).
2According to the Harrison and List (2004) terminology
3IntheoriginalspeciﬁcationofCPT byTverskyandKahneman(1992),twodistinctparametersrepresenttheutility
functioncurvature,onefor the gaindomainand the other forthe loss domain. However,in most empiricalapplications
they are merged.
4where ω is a probabilityweighting function. It is strictly increasing from the unit interval into itself
and satisﬁes ω(0) = 0 and ω(1) = 1 4.
The form of the weighting function has been widely discussed in the literature. Following
Tanaka, Camerer, and Nguyen (2010), Prelec (1998) speciﬁcation is preferred:
ω(p) = exp−[−lnp]γ (γ > 0) (3)
where γ is the probability sensitivity. The normal assumption, backed by a substantial amount
of empirical evidence is that γ < 1. This gives the weighting function an “inverse S-shape”,
characterized by overweightingsmallprobabilitiesand underweightinghighprobabilities. If γ > 1
the function takes the less conventional “S-shape”, with convexity for smaller probabilities and
concavity for larger probabilities. This CPT model reduces to expected utility if λ = 1 and γ = 1.
4.2 Structural estimation
A more ﬂexible way of eliciting preference parameters is the direct estimation of some structural
decision model, as exposed by Harless and Camerer (1994). In particular, this approach is suitable
for speciﬁcations with several preference parameters, as in decision weighting models. Applied to
data from Tanaka, Camerer, and Nguyen (2010) experimental design, it enables us to estimate
jointly all three parameters of CPT. Moreover, in structural estimation, subjects can be easily
allowed to make some errors.
We follow such a strategy to identify several random preference models under EUT and CPT.
In the experiment, we have asked the participants to choose between lotteries A and B. We
compute now the likelihood function derived from individual choices associated to the EUT model
and the CPT model.
Let us ﬁrst assume that the utility of income is deﬁned by u(y) = yr which corresponds to the
usual constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) speciﬁcation.
Assuming that the subjects choose the lottery A if ∆EUT +ǫ ≥ 0 where ∆EUT = EUA −EUB
and ǫ is a normally distributed error term with mean zero and variance v2 , then the likelihood of

















EUT)) × 1 I(δi = B)
 
(4)
where i indexes the different lotteries in tasks, Φ(.) denotes the cumulative normal distribution
function, 1 I is the indicator function, δi = A[B] denotes the choice of the lottery A [B] and X is a
vector of observable characteristics of the individual. The maximum-likelihood estimation for the
CRRA r is therefore ˆ r = argmaxlnLEUT(r;δ,X).
Since the CRRA might appear very restrictive, one may consider other functional forms of
utility which allow, for instance, for varying degrees of relative risk aversion (RRA). Here we
consider, the Expo-Power (EP) utility function proposed by Saha (1993):
u(y) = [1 − exp(−βy
r)]/β (5)
where β and α are two parameters controlling the shape of the absolute and the relative risk
aversionfunctions. TheEPutilityfunctioncollapseswiththeCRRA speciﬁcation whenβ → 0 and
4Tversky and Kahneman’s (1992) CPT allows different probability weighting functions, one for the gain domain
and the other for the loss domain. However, in most empirical applications they are the same.
5with a CARA utility if r → 1. An alternative paradigm for subject behavior could be cumulative
prospect theory (CPT). We use the same speciﬁcation as in Section 4.1.
The implementation of the maximum likelihood for the three models of behaviour has been
done in STATA. We take into account the possibility of correlation between responses by the same
subject. The standard errors on estimates are corrected for the possibility that the 33 responses are
clustered for the same subject. The STATA program uses the STATA maximum likelihood routines
on our structural choice models (EUT and CPT).
5 Results
5.1 Risk Task Results
The distribution of switching points over respondents is shown in Table 3. Extreme switches,
namely at the ﬁrst row or never, represent more than half of the responses in Series 1 and Series 2,
and one third of the responses in Series 3. In Series 2 and Series 3 “never switch” responses are
twice as much numerous than “switch at the ﬁrst row” responses. Thus, these particular response
patterns are expected to affect the estimation of parameters. Such responses could partly proceed
from a a low commitment to the experiment, a bad comprehension of instructions, or a cognitive
burden that someindividualsare not ableto handle, and, as such, deservesomeextraconsideration.
We build two sub-samples S1 and S2. In S1 individuals who chose either “switch at the ﬁrst row”
or “never switch” for all three series (11 individuals) are excluded 5, and in S2 the ones who chose
“switch at the ﬁrst row” or “never switch” in each of the three series (11 individuals). Thus, S2 is
included into S1.
5.2 Estimation of risk preferences with the interval method
In this section we discuss σ, λ and γ estimations provided by the interval method described in
Section 4.1. Table 4 reports the results for the full sample of farmers, and the two sub-samples.
In the full sample, the mean values of σ and λ are 0.54 and 2.78, which means that, on average,
respondents are risk averse and loss averse. Regarding probability sensitivity, we ﬁnd an average γ
of 0.67, indicating that respondents overweight low probabilities according to an inverse S-shaped
weighting function. These estimates are in line with those calculated by Tanaka, Camerer, and
Nguyen (2010) and Liu (2010) for rural people from developing countries with the same kind
of experimental design 6. The λ parameter is the only one to be impacted by extreme response
patterns. It is estimated to be 2.60 for sub-sample S1 and 2.32 for sub-sample S1.
As previously informed, the CRRA expected utility model is nested into our PT model. The
mean values of λ and γ are signiﬁcantly different from 1 at the 1% level by t-test, meaning that,
overall, CPT describes our data better than EUT.
In orderto identifythedeterminantsoftheriskpreference parameters, welead OLSregressions
against socio-demographic variables. Results are displayed in Table 5. We ﬁnd that more educated
subjects tend to be less loss averse. Income security also lowers loss aversion signiﬁcantly.
5Liu (2010) ﬁnd that 7.6% of individuals in her sample of farmers follow this kind of response patterns. In our
case, it is 10.3%.
6Tanaka, Camerer, and Nguyen (2010) and Liu (2010) report respectively mean values of about 0.60 and 0.52 for
utility curvature and 2.63 and 3.47 for loss aversion. They ﬁnd 0.74 and 0.69 for probability sensitivity.
65.3 Estimation of a structural model of risk preferences
In Table 6, we report the estimationsof risk preferences for the various decision models considered
(EUT with CRRA utility function, EUT with EP utility function, CPT with power utility function).
We report in parts A, C and E of this Table the direct estimation of the parameter of interest. In
part B, D and F we introduce individual covariates.
Part A reports the maximum likelihood estimates obtained with the EUT-CRRA speciﬁcation.
The coefﬁcient r is estimated to be 0.27, with a 95% conﬁdence interval between 0.24 and 0.30.
This indicates very risk averse behaviors. Introducing covariates (part B) results in a very similar
point estimate of r, the average distribution of r being still 0.27. Highly educated farmers and
those who have adopted innovations appear to be less risk averse.
Relaxing the CRRA assumption, we consider now the EP utility function in part C and D of
Table 6. In part C, both r and β are signiﬁcant at 1%. Since ˆ β is strictly positive and since ˆ r
belongs to ]0,1[, risk preferences appear to be characterized by DARA (decreasing absolute risk
aversion) and IRRA (increasing relative risk aversion). None of the covariates we have considered
appears to be signiﬁcant to explain the variability of r and β across individuals.
Part E and F of Table 6 report maximum likelihood estimates of the CPT speciﬁcation without
and with covariates. All the three parameters of the homogenous CPT model are signiﬁcant at
1%. The estimated loss aversion parameter λ is 2.49 and is signiﬁcantly different from 1 at the
1% signiﬁcance level. Our estimate of the loss aversion is highly consistent with the value (2.25)
reported by Tversky and Kahneman (1992). The estimated probability sensitivity parameter γ
is equal to 0.78 and is signiﬁcantly different from 1 as well. This provides some evidence of
probability weighting in the expected direction: the weighting function has an ‘inverse S-shape”
characterized by overweighting of small probabilities and underweighting of high probabilities.
As in the EU-CRRA speciﬁcation, in the CPT speciﬁcation highly educated farmers and those
who have adopted innovationsappear to be less risk averse. On the contrary, the older the farmer is
then thehigherwillbe theriskaversion. Age, education leveland householdsizedecrease farmers’
loss aversion. Finally, older farmers or farmers with a large farm size have more linear probability
weighting functions. On the contrary, farmers with a high level of secured income are more likely
to overweight small probabilities and to underweight high probabilities.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have contributed to the literature on risk behaviour by eliciting preferences
under EUT and CPT on a sample of non-standard subjects. Our sample is made of 107 French
farmers who have made choices between gain-lotteries and mixed lotteries. We used real monetary
incentives. Two different estimation methods, namely the interval approach and the estimation of a
random preference model lead to close results. The latter has the advantage of allowingindividuals
to make some errors when making choices. On average, farmers are risk averse and loss averse.
They also exhibit an inverse S-shape probability function, meaning that they tend to overweight
smallprobabilitiesand underweighthigh probabilities. We inferfrom ourresultsthat CPT explains
farmers’ behaviour better than EUT in the context of our experiment. The values elicited for
risk aversion, loss aversion and probability sensitivity are close to those in Tanaka, Camerer, and
Nguyen (2010) and Liu (2010) which us the same experimental design in developing countries.
We also investigated how preferences correlate with individual socio-demographic
characteristics. We ﬁnd that education and agricultural innovation are negatively linked with risk
aversion. Our results also show that age, education, household size and the level of secured income
7tend to lower farmers’ loss aversion. Finally, older farmers or farmers with large farms do not
distort probabilities as much as the others.
Further research would consist in estimating a mixture model, assuming explicitly that the
observed behaviour can proceed from different theoretical frameworks, according to choices and
subjects.
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9Table 1: Experimental design, adapted from Tanaka et al. (2010).
Option A Option B Expected payoff difference (A-B)
Series1
Row Prob 30% Prob 70% Prob 10% Prob 90%
1 400 100 680 50 77
2 400 100 750 50 70
3 400 100 830 50 60
4 400 100 930 50 52
5 400 100 1060 50 39
6 400 100 1250 50 20
7 400 100 1500 50 -5
8 400 100 1850 50 -40
9 400 100 2200 50 -75
10 400 100 3000 50 -155
11 400 100 4000 50 -255
12 400 100 6000 50 -455
Series2
Row Prob 90% Prob 10% Prob 70% Prob 30%
1 400 300 540 50 -3
2 400 300 560 50 -17
3 400 300 580 50 -31
4 400 300 600 50 -45
5 400 300 620 50 -59
6 400 300 650 50 -80
7 400 300 680 50 -101
8 400 300 720 50 -129
9 400 300 770 50 -164
10 400 300 830 50 -206
11 400 300 900 50 -255
12 400 300 1000 50 -325
13 400 300 1100 50 -395
14 400 300 1300 50 -535
Series3
Row Prob 50% Prob 50% Prob 50% Prob 50%
1 250 -40 300 -210 60
2 40 -40 300 -210 -45
3 10 -40 300 -210 -60
4 10 -40 300 -160 -85
5 10 -80 300 -160 -105
6 10 -80 300 -140 -115
7 10 -80 300 -110 -130
10Table 2: Sample descriptive statistics.
Mean Standard Deviation







Age: age of the subject (years)
Adopt: dummy if the subject grows miscanthus, an innovative crop that appeared in the region around 2005
Educ+: dummy if education level beyond secondary school
HHsize: household size (number of individuals)
FSize: farm size (ha)
SecureInc: proportion of the household income coming for another professional activity than farming (%)
Table 3: Distribution of switching points.
Proportion of respondents
Switching point Series 1 Series 2 Series 3
1 15 26 10
2 3 2 7
3 1 1 14
4 0 0 13
5 3 3 24
6 7 2 5
7 14 3 4







never 38 33 22
Total 100 100 100
11Table 4: Parameter estimates with the interval method.
Parameter Mean Standard Deviation












Table 5: OLS regressions of risk parameters on socio-demographic characteristics.
Variable Utility curvature (σ) Loss aversion (λ) Probability sensitivity (γ)
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Age -0.001 0.005 -0.028 0.027 0.001 0.004
Adopt 0.044 0.088 0.012 0.480 0.111 0.071
Educ+ 0.083 0.097 -1.106** 0.532 0.048 0.079
HHsize -0.034 0.030 -0.244 0.164 -0.014 0.024
Fsize 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 -0.000 0.000
SecureInc 0.192 0.176 -1.930** 0.963 -0.138 0.143
Constant 0.544** 0.276 5.430*** 1.509 0.701*** 0.223
Number of observations 107 107 107
R2 0.05 0.14 0.04
***,**,* for signiﬁcant at 1,5,10% respectively.
12Table 6: Maximum likelihood estimates of preferences using various structural models.
Parameter Variable Coef Std. Err. z P>|z| 95% Conf. Interval
A/ EUT CRRA utility and homogenous preferences (Log pseudolikelihood = -2404.0794)
Constant 0.266 0.015 18.23 0.000 0.237 0.294
B/ EUT CRRA utility and heterogenous preferences (Log pseudolikelihood= -2366.5955)
r Age 0.001 0.002 0.33 0.745 -0.003 0.004
Adopt 0.052 0.030 1.76 0.078 -0.006 0.110
Educ+ 0.053 0.029 1.81 0.071 -0.004 0.110
HHsize 0.012 0.010 1.13 0.257 -0.009 0.032
Fsize 0.000 0.000 -1.23 0.220 -0.001 0.000
SecureInc 0.003 0.060 0.05 0.963 -0.116 0.121
Constant 0.201 0.084 2.4 0.017 0.037 0.366
C/ EUT Exo-Power utility and homogenous preferences (Log pseudolikelihood= -2310.8171)
r Constant 0.357 0.015 23.34 0.000 0.327 0.387
β Constant 0.091 0.011 8.32 0.000 0.070 0.113
D/ EUT Exo-Power utility and heterogenous preferences (Log pseudolikelihood = -2245.661 )
r Age 0.000 0.003 -0.13 0.895 -0.006 0.005
Adopt -0.007 0.033 -0.21 0.837 -0.072 0.058
Educ+ -0.024 0.042 -0.57 0.572 -0.105 0.058
HHsize 0.011 0.011 0.97 0.333 -0.011 0.033
Fsize 0.000 0.000 -1.36 0.174 -0.001 0.000
SecureInc -0.096 0.066 -1.46 0.146 -0.226 0.033
Constant 0.442 0.147 3.02 0.003 0.155 0.729
β Age -0.002 0.002 -1.01 0.311 -0.005 0.002
Adopt -0.027 0.021 -1.3 0.193 -0.067 0.014
Educ+ -0.055 0.037 -1.49 0.136 -0.127 0.017
HHsize -0.010 0.008 -1.26 0.206 -0.026 0.006
Fsize 0.000 0.000 1.17 0.243 0.000 0.001
SecureInc -0.002 0.053 -0.03 0.973 -0.106 0.103
Constant 0.197 0.088 2.23 0.026 0.024 0.369
E/ CPT and homogenous preferences (Log pseudolikelihood = -2246.4701)
σ Constant 0.344 0.006 57.03 0.000 0.333 0.356
λ Constant 2.488 0.096 25.87 0.000 2.300 2.677
γ Constant 0.779 0.017 46.26 0.000 0.746 0.812
F/ CPT and heterogeneous preferences (Log pseudolikelihood = -2159.3605 )
σ Age -0.002 0.001 -2.2 0.028 -0.003 0.000
Adopt 0.046 0.014 3.34 0.001 0.019 0.073
Educ+ 0.043 0.014 3.06 0.002 0.016 0.071
HHsize 0.003 0.005 0.64 0.520 -0.006 0.012
Fsize 0.000 0.000 -1.51 0.132 0.000 0.000
SecureInc 0.037 0.028 1.330 0.183 -0.018 0.092
Constant 0.393 0.041 9.6 0.000 0.313 0.474
λ Age -0.025 0.012 -2.13 0.033 -0.049 -0.002
Adopt 0.143 0.209 0.68 0.494 -0.267 0.552
Educ+ -0.808 0.226 -3.57 0.000 -1.251 -0.365
HHsize -0.124 0.067 -1.86 0.062 -0.255 0.006
Fsize -0.001 0.001 -1.35 0.177 -0.003 0.001
SecureInc -1.753 0.431 -4.070 0 -2.599 -0.908
Constant 5.040 0.667 7.56 0.000 3.733 6.347
γ Age 0.004 0.002 1.77 0.077 0.000 0.007
Adopt 0.042 0.037 1.14 0.255 -0.030 0.114
Educ+ 0.012 0.037 0.32 0.753 -0.060 0.083
HHsize -0.016 0.012 -1.33 0.184 -0.038 0.007
Fsize 0.000 0.000 -1.99 0.047 -0.001 0.000
SecureInc -0.232 0.073 -3.180 0.001 -0.376 -0.089
Constant 0.772 0.106 7.28 0.000 0.565 0.980
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